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Abstract  
A growing body of literature has recently focused on the economic origins and consequences of 
modern maritime piracy and on the perception that the international community has failed to 
control it. This paper aims to investigate maritime transport costs as one of the channels through 
which modern maritime piracy could have a major impact on the global economy. A transport-
cost equation is estimated using a newly released dataset on maritime transport costs from the 
OECD together with data on maritime piracy from the IMB. Our results show that maritime 
piracy significantly increases trade costs between Europe and Asia.  
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1- Introduction 
 
There is growing evidence showing that maritime piracy increases maritime transport costs for a 
number of reasons. First, in 2008 some ship-owners have made clear their intention to re-route 
some of their lines to avoid dangerous waters. Second, Lloyds added the Gulf of Aden to its list 
of warzones in May 2008, based on the claim of insurers and sailors for a premium when a 
vessel navigates in this region. Finally, firms providing security services are flourishing as a 
consequence of piracy
 1
. Those are probably the main channels through which freight rates are 
impacted by maritime piracy. However, the lack of systematic data on insurance contracts
2
, 
salaries paid by ship-owners, the proportion of ships re-routed, the investment in defense 
measures and poor data on freight rates makes it difficult to conduct a comprehensive study of 
the impact of piracy on transport costs. This is an important caveat given that in a world of 
decreasing trade barriers (custom duties and tariffs), transport costs have become one of the main 
obstacles to international trade (Hummels, 2001).  
As acts of piracy mainly occur on the Euro-Asia maritime trade route, higher freight rates may 
hinder trade between these two continents. Increasing transport prices might also reinforce the 
idea put forward by the shipping industry to develop a northern trade route between Europe and 
                                                          
1
 The most important shipping companies, CMA-CGM, MSC and Maersk have announced in 2009 they would 
divert some of their lines through the Cape route (Times 2008, Port Strategy 2009). The Indian shipping association 
has declared that depending on the size, the war risk premium for merchant vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean has 
risen from $500 per ship and per voyage to as much as $150,000 per ship and per voyage (Financial Express, 2011). 
Shipping companies such as Interoient Line Services have considered hiring private security service companies, 
costing US$60,000 per trip (Miller, 2008). 
2
 See Ploch et al. (2010) for more information on the problems linked to insurance, notably the fact that US ship-
owners do not have to insure themselves against the risk of war. 
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Asia, passing through the Arctic region. This development could have far-reaching consequences 
in terms of environmental costs and on the economies currently benefiting from their position on 
the current route between Europe and Asia, such as Egypt or Singapore.  
This paper aims to fulfill some of the abovementioned gaps in the literature by testing the effect 
of modern maritime piracy on maritime trade costs. We propose a simple model of transport cost 
determination and derive a transport costs equation augmented with maritime piracy as an 
additional explanatory variable. As far as the authors of this paper are aware, this is the first 
study that focuses on unitary transport costs as a response variable. We overcome the major 
hurdle of data availability by using a new database on maritime transport costs compiled by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and data on modern 
maritime piracy obtained from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The information at 
industry level provided in the maritime transport cost database allows us to test whether pirates 
attack more ships transporting certain types of goods
3
. 
Our findings reveal that maritime piracy has a significant and positive impact on maritime 
transport costs. One additional ship hijacked results in a 1.2% increase in maritime transport 
costs between Europe and Asia. These results may be important for policymakers interested in 
the relative position of Euro-Asian trade compared to USA-Asian trade. In particular, we show 
that localized conflicts could selectively harm some international trade routes.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on maritime piracy and 
transport costs. Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 
                                                          
3
 Hastings (2009) reports anecdotal evidence suggesting that may be the case in the Malacca Strait. 
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outlines the specification of the model and empirical estimation and section 5 presents the main 
results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6. 
2- MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSPORT COSTS 
Our paper brings together two different strands of the economic literature: while the first 
analyzes the economic aspects of modern maritime piracy, the second focuses on the 
determinants of international transport cost. 
2.1 Modern maritime piracy and international trade 
A number of international trade economists have modeled the impact of adverse conditions, such 
as insecurity, conflicts and terrorism, on international trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002 and 
2005; Mirza and Verdier, 2008). Maritime piracy has also been specifically linked to trade. In 
particular, Bendall (2010) and Fu et al (2010) focus on the economic impact of maritime piracy 
on trade through the decision of ship operators to change their main trade routes between Europe 
and Asia in order to avoid Somali piracy. Moreover, Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso (2011) 
evaluate the impact of maritime piracy on the volume of trade between European and Asian 
countries. We aim to extend this research by analyzing the effect of maritime piracy on the price 
of maritime transport.  
We also contribute to the ongoing debate in the scientific community on the motivations and 
methods used by pirates. Some researchers sustain that pirates do not choose their prey according 
to the shipment transported by the vessel (Mejia and al, 2009), but tend to avoid attacking ships 
flying the colors of countries with a military presence in the immediate vicinity (Kiourktsoglou 
and Coutroubis, 2010). Another view supported by Hastings (2009) is that pirates choose their 
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targets according to the value of the shipment transported on the black market. This author 
indicates that Somali and Malaccan pirates behave differently. While Somali pirates are mostly 
interested in the ransom they expect to receive for the ship and the crew, Malaccan pirates are 
mostly interested in rapidly selling back their loot. The main reason for this behavior is the 
pressure exerted by the authorities around them and the possibility that a particular region will 
offer to sell back the stolen freight. However, the fact that Malaccan pirates care about the 
shipments of the vessels they attack does not mean that they will systematically prey on the same 
sort of merchandise. Our paper gives some support to the first argument, that is, pirates are not 
concerned with the type of good transported, by showing that this is not the case at least within 
broadly defined goods categories.  
2.2 The determinants of transport costs 
International trade economists have been using the iceberg transport cost
4
 formulation for many 
years as an analytical device that greatly simplifies trade analysis. However, the explicit iceberg 
assumption is not observational or empirical. Indeed, transport costs per ton are not invariant 
with respect to the tonnage of the material delivered. In applied work, distance has been used for 
many years in gravity models of trade as a proxy for transport costs, assuming that transport 
costs are an increasing function of distance between the trading countries. However distance 
remains an unsatisfactory measure of trade costs because it is time-invariant and independent of 
the tonnage of transported goods. It has been only in the last two decades that more sophisticated 
methods have been employed to measure transport costs and to analyze their impact on 
international trade. In the early 2000s, Limao and Venables (2001) and Micco and Perez (2001) 
                                                          
4
 According to the iceberg transport cost assumption, some of the goods to be delivered are consumed by the very 
act of transporting. 
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added infrastructure variables to gravity equations to better characterize the impact of transport 
costs on trade. A second wave of research emphasized that transport costs are indeed 
endogenously determined (Martinez Zarzoso and Suarez Burguet, 2005; Wilmsmeier and 
Martinez-Zarzoso, 2010; Korinek and Sourdin, 2009a,b). Transport costs may be endogenous for 
a number of reasons, such as the presence of economies of scale in transport or the existence of 
trade imbalances that cause the price of transport to differ depending on the direction of trade. 
For example, Martinez Zarzoso and Suarez Burguet (2005) estimate a simultaneous system of 
equations of transport costs and trade where both variables are considered endogenous. 
Similarly, Wilmsmeier and Martinez-Zarzoso (2010) propose a transport costs model in which 
trade is endogenous and trade imbalances are an important determinant of transport costs. We 
specify a similar model introducing modern maritime piracy as an additional variable that 
determines international maritime transport costs.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that exploring the channels through which piracy affects transport 
costs using statistical methods is beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned in the 
introduction, we only found anecdotal evidence showing that sailors’ salaries and insurance cost 
had increased as a consequence of maritime piracy. Indeed, we did not find comprehensive data 
on either insurance premiums or sailors’ salaries. In addition, differences between the various 
types of insurance across countries made any type of comparison difficult. For example, the U.S 
Maritime War Risk Insurance Program covers the additional risk of maritime piracy directed 
against U.S vessels (Ploch et al. 2010). 
Concerning the use of the Cape Route, it is particularly difficult to make a clear evaluation of the 
number of ships that are being effectively re-routed. It is hard to believe that re-routing ships 
around the Cape is a safe solution for most of the maritime commercial traffic, as the activities of 
7 
 
Somali pirates has spread to the north of Madagascar and Mauritius (see Figure 1). Finally, 
shipping companies are particularly secretive when it comes to the measures they take to defend 
their ships. We fail to find satisfying proxies for either of these variables to be used in our study. 
3 MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSPORT COSTS: THE CURRENT 
SITUATION 
3.1 Geography of maritime trade and piracy 
Maritime piracy depends on the existence of advantageous geographical conditions, namely 
narrow straits to spot future preys, islets or coastal areas remote enough to escape any form of 
authority (Murphy, 2008; Ong-Webb, 2007). Not only geographical conditions are important, but 
also the geo-economic and political context of the countries suitably located to host piracy. 
Maritime piracy could indeed take roots when intensively used maritime trade routes pass nearby 
potential pirates’ harbors located in failed or weak states. Nowadays, the two main maritime 
piracy hot spots, the Malacca straits and the Gulf of Aden, both have these favorable conditions. 
Malaccan piracy was more intense in the late nineties, whereas Somali piracy plays the leading 
role today. These two hot spots of maritime piracy are located on the trade routes linking Asia to 
Europe. 
In order to examine the extent of the problem posed by piracy to shipping between Europe and 
Asia, we rely on a similar strategy to that in Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso (2011), but focus on 
the price of transport as the response variable instead of focusing on trade volumes. We have 
divided the oceans between the two continents into five regions: the European Seas (ES) from 
the coastal areas of Iceland and Norway in the North to the waters of the Canary Islands in the 
South, in addition to the Mediterranean and Black Seas; the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden 
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(RSGA) which includes a vast area of the Indian Ocean along the shores of Oman, Somalia and 
Tanzania; the Indian Sub-Continental Seas (ISCS) along the shores of Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives; the South-East-Asian Seas (SEAS) comprising the 
waters of Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as those of Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma 
and Cambodia; and the East-Asian Seas (EAS) which encompasses the Yellow Sea between 
China and Korea, the East and South China Seas and the Japanese coasts . 
Figure 1. Maritime Regions 
A ship heading from a port in northern Europe to China must cross all five maritime regions; 
four if it ends its journey in Singapore and three if it unloads its shipment in Mumbai (see Table 
A.1 in the Appendix). The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Live Piracy Report offers 
information on the number of annual incidents of piracy in each of the five regions between 1999 
and 2007, as well as the number of incidents on three different routes linking Europe and Asia 
over this 9-year period (see Graph A.1 & A2 in the Appendix).  
We are mostly interested in the Euro-Asia route because very few piracy incidents occur on the 
main shipping lines connecting other large economic areas. One way to investigate the impact of 
piracy on transport costs geographically is to compare the evolution of transport costs on the 
Europe-Asia route with trends in other regions that are not affected by piracy. Figure 2 shows the 
trend in maritime transport costs on two trade routes: the USA-EU15 trade route and the China-
EU15 trade route. Only the second route has been plagued with a high level of piracy. The graph 
shows that the freight rates for container transport have behaved differently on each trade route. 
While transport costs are clearly decreasing in USA-EU15 trade, numbers are only slightly 
decreasing for the China-EU15 over the entire period, with spikes in 1999 and 2004. These peaks 
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could be due to maritime piracy, but market conditions may also have played an important role. 
This paper shows that piracy has a “positive” impact on maritime trade costs once the impact of 
the size of the trading countries, the trade imbalance between these countries, their volume of 
trade and other unobservable time-variant factors common to all routes are taken into account.   
Figure 2. Average transport freight rates for two alternative routes 
We differentiate between three kinds of incidents according to the extent to which a ship’s 
journey is disrupted: attempted acts of piracy, boarding acts and hijackings. An attempted act of 
piracy occurs when pirates board a ship and abandon it empty-handed after being discovered, or 
when a ship comes under fire without being stopped. Instances of boarding entail the actual 
boarding of a ship by pirates and theft (generally the personal belongings of the crew and/or 
goods carried for crew maintenance and en-route ship repairs). These incidents may involve 
violence against the crew. The last type of piracy, hijacking, consists in the seizure of the ship 
and its crew, the immobilization of the ship in a coastal area under the control of the pirates and a 
ransom being demanded in exchange for the crew members, the ship and its cargo. Hijackings 
are obviously the most disruptive for maritime trade. Figure 3 shows the evolution over time of 
the three types of acts of piracy between Europe and East Asia. 
Figure 3. Number of piracy acts by type on the Europe-East Asia Route 
3.2 MEASUREMENT OF TRANSPORT COSTS 
One of the main difficulties in analyzing transport costs is obtaining reliable data. There have 
been several attempts in the recent economic literature to measure transport costs either directly 
or indirectly. Some authors have used CIF/FOB ratios as a proxy for shipping costs (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2001, Limao and Venables, 2001; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). Since most importing 
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countries report trade flows inclusive of freight and insurance (CIF) and exporting countries 
report trade flows exclusive of freight and insurance (FOB), transport costs can be calculated as 
the difference between both flows for the same aggregate trade. However, Hummels (1999b) 
showed that importer CIF/FOB ratios constructed from IMF sources are poor proxies for cross-
sectional variation in transport costs and such variables provide no information about changes in 
transport costs over time. Oguledo and Mcphee (1994) also doubted the usefulness of CIF/FOB 
ratios from IMF sources as a proxy of transportation costs.  
Several authors have attempted to construct more accurate measures of transport costs. Hummels 
(1999a, 1999b) use data on transport costs from various primary sources including shipping price 
indices obtained from shipping trade journals (Appendix 2 in Hummels, 1999b) and freight rates 
(freight expenditures on imports) collected by customs agencies in the United States, New 
Zealand and five Latin American countries (Mercosur plus Chile). In addition to the CIF/FOB 
ratios reported by the IMF, Limao and Venables (2001) use shipping company quotes for the 
cost of transporting a standard container (40 feet) from Baltimore to sixty-four destinations. The 
authors pointed out that it is not clear how the experience of Baltimore can be generalized. 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2003) use data on transportation costs obtained from interviews with 
shippers in Spain. Micco and Perez (2001) use data from the U.S Import Waterborne Databank 
(U.S. Department of Transportation), where transport costs are defined as "the aggregate cost of 
all freight, insurance and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties) incurred in bringing the 
merchandise from the port of exportation to the first port of entry in the U.S.". Sanchez, 
Hoffmann, Micco, Pizzolitto and Sgut (2002) analyzed data on maritime transport costs obtained 
from the International Transport Data Base (BTI). They focused on Latin American trade with 
NAFTA. 
11 
 
In this paper, we use a newly released database from the OECD, which overcomes some of the 
problems presented by the precedent databases. This database contains maritime trade for 20 
importing countries and 218 exporting countries for the period 1991 to 2007, covering different 
categories of products. The data come from several reliable sources (original customs data from 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States and also private sources, such as Containerization 
International, Drewry Consulting and the Baltic Dry Shipping Index). A sound methodology is 
used to harmonize these various sets of observations (Korinek, 2008). The advantages of this 
database in terms of comprehensiveness and time span make it a valuable tool for the study of 
transport costs (Korinek and Sourdin, 2009a,b). Figure 4 displays the evolution of average unit 
transport costs for four categories of goods (manufactured goods, dirty bulk, crude oil and 
agricultural goods) exported from Europe (EU15) to Asia.  
Figure 4. Average maritime transport costs for four types of goods shipped between 
Europe and Asia 
4 FACTORS EXPLAINING TRANSPORT COSTS 
4.1 Model specification 
A general formulation of transport costs for commodity k shipped between countries i and j, in a 
given period of time, can be written as: 
TCijkt = F(Xit, Xjt, vijt, ωk, μij, φt)      (1) 
where Xit and Xjt are country-specific characteristics, vijt is a vector of characteristics related to 
the journey between i and j, ωk is a product-specific effect that captures differences in transport 
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demand elasticity across goods, μij represents unobservable heterogeneity that is specific to each 
trade flow and φt denotes time-specific unobservable heterogeneity. 
GDP and the population of the trading countries are used to proxy for country-specific 
characteristics, such as infrastructure and the quality of institutions
5
. The vector vijt includes the 
trade imbalance between countries i and j, a proxy for economies of scale is the volume traded 
between countries i and j, and our variable of interest, namely the number of piracy incidents 
involving hijacking along the trade route linking country i and j. Distance between i and j and 
other variables related to each bilateral trade relationship could be added to model μij , but we 
have preferred to specify bilateral fixed effects μij in order to capture all the time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity attached to each pair of trading countries. Product-specific dummy 
variables are used to account for ωk and time-specific dummy variables (φt) are added as a proxy 
for unobserved variables that influence transport costs and are time-variant but common to all 
trading pairs, such as technological improvements in transport.  
Assuming a multiplicative form, a transport cost function is specified as: 
  
where TCijkt denotes unitary maritime transport costs for each 2-digit HS product category, i 
denotes the importer country, j the exporter country, t the year and k the 2-digit level of the HS 
classification. Y represents the GPD of the corresponding country, while Pop denotes population. 
Imb is the trade imbalance between country i and j calculated as the difference between exports 
from i to j and imports of i from j in absolute value. XM denotes trade volumes in tons calculated 
                                                          
5
 We also used alternative variables, namely road infrastructure and a linear shipping connectivity index as proxies 
for infrastructure. The results concerning our target variable remained unchanged and are available upon request 
from the authors. 
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as the sum of exports and imports, Hijackrt is the number of piracy incidents involving hijacking 
along the trade route r in year t linking country i and j. Other types of piracy incidents (boarded 
ships and attempted attacks) will also be considered as explanatory variables. μij, ωk and φt 
denote the different sets of fixed effects described above. Finally, εijkt is the error term that is 
assumed to be identically and independently distributed.  
Taking natural logarithms of equation (2) we obtain a linear version of the general specification 
given by, 
 
where ln denotes natural logarithms and all the variables have been described after equation (2). 
4.2 Data and variables 
In this section we describe the data and variables used in our empirical work. Sources and 
variable definitions are listed in Table A.2. The dependent variable (TC) is obtained from the 
OECD data base on maritime transport costs. We use the maritime transport costs between the 
European Union and 13 destinations in Asia
6
 for each HS 2 digits class of goods. We 
differentiate four types of goods: manufactured goods, raw materials, agricultural goods and 
crude oil. The target variable is t_hijack , which stands for the number of hijacked ships on a 
particular route. Each pair of countries is associated with one trade route. We expect t_hijack to 
correlate positively with maritime transport costs. Other variables that measure piracy incidents 
                                                          
6
 For the European Union, the maritime transport cost database considers the EU15 as a single emitter of data. Data 
for Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovenia are also 
available.  The Asian countries in our dataset are Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Australia was added to this group. 
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are: t_boarded, the number of incidents in which a ship has been boarded but not hijacked; and 
t_attempted, the number of attempted attacks that do not succeed. These two variables will also 
be used in the empirical analysis as additional explanatory variables.  
Additional explanatory variables are: GDP (Yit ; Yjt), population (Popit ; Popjt), trade imbalances 
(Imbijt) and trade volumes (XMijt). The source for the three first variables is the world 
development indicators dataset (WDI) from the World Bank. GDP and the population of the 
importer and exporter countries are used as control variables for country characteristics. Trade 
imbalance is expected to be negatively correlated with bilateral maritime transport costs if 
bidirectional transport costs between two regions are jointly determined, since transport costs 
will depend on the relative demand for transport between regions (Jonkeren, Demirel Ommeren 
and Rietveld, 2010). Finally trade volume is expected to have a reducing effect on transport 
prices, since routes characterized by intense trade may foster competition and reduce 
transportation costs. This variable has been obtained from Eurostat. Summary statistics of the 
described variables are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
An alternative variable that could be used instead of piracy events is the Lloyd’s classification of 
a warzone. Table A.3 shows the evolution of the different zones monitored in the last 6 reports of 
the Joint War Committee available on line. We would like to underline that for most of the 
observations, when a country is listed the war zone refers to the limits of the national waters of 
this country. This definition, pertinent and useful when a war has occurred and insurance 
companies require a strictly defined geographical perimeter, is in our opinion limited when it 
comes to addressing the problem of piracy. With the only exception of thieves in ports, pirate 
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attacks occur en route. It is true that most of these attacks take place not far from a coastal area, 
but pirates do not feel bound by the territorial limits defined internationally (particularly in the 
zones were several national maritime zones are in contact or very close, as in the Gulf of Aden or 
the Strait of Malacca). The joint war committee has tackled this problem by defining broader 
zones of danger (Gulf of Aden, Sulu Archipelago). In this instance, the Gulf of Aden zone 
juxtaposes almost perfectly with the Red Sea Gulf of Aden maritime zone defined in our paper. 
Even if similar zones are defined, the war zone classification has the important disadvantage of 
not revealing any information on the intensity of the conflict and also displays very few 
variations over time. By providing a count of the number of incidents over time for each 
geographic zone and trade route defined, the IMB database was more suitable for the type of 
study we aimed to carry out. Despite the abovementioned disadvantages we decided to use also 
warzones in addition to piracy events in the robustness checks’ section. 
5 Empirical application and main results 
5.1 Main results 
Equation (3) has been estimated using a least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDV) with 
different sets of dummies to control for unobservable heterogeneity. To test whether piracy acts 
have different impacts on transport costs depending on the nature of transported goods, we 
estimate Equation (3) for four different types of goods (agriculture, manufactures, raw materials 
and crude oil) and two different types of transport (container carriers and tankers transporting 
dirty bulk). Two types of piracy acts, namely the number of hijacked ships and number of 
boarded ships, enter the trade cost equation significantly
7
. In addition, aggregate attacks and also 
                                                          
7
 Attempted attacks were also originally considered, but the variable was not statistically significant and as a result is 
not included in the final estimations. 
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pirate success rates calculated as (hijacks/aggregate attacks) are also considered as target 
variables. The baseline estimation results are shown in Table 2 (LSDV estimates). The estimated 
effect of piracy on transport costs is slightly lower when aggregate effects are considered in 
comparison with the single coefficients for hijacks and boarded ships (column 1 in Table 2). 
Column 6 in Table 2 shows the results for aggregate attacks (t_tot). As regards the results 
concerning success rates (column 7 in Table 2), the estimated coefficient for aggregate trade is 2, 
indicating that an increase of 1 percent in the rate of success increases transport costs by 2 
percentage points
8
. 
[Table 2] 
In Table 3 we estimate Equation (3) with the variables t_hijack and t_boarded lagged two years
9
. 
In doing so, we control for the possibility that shipping contracts are agreed upon in advance. 
The estimated coefficients for the different sets of fixed effects (k, ij, t) are not shown
10
. Both 
Tables report the results assuming common coefficients for all types of products in the first 
column and specific estimates for four different types of goods, namely manufactures, 
agricultural goods, raw materials and crude oil in columns 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  
 [Table 3] 
In both estimations (LSDV and LSDV with lagged piracy variables) the piracy coefficients have 
the expected positive signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels for total trade, 
manufactures and agricultural products. The coefficients in Table 3 are slightly higher for 
                                                          
8
 Similar results were obtained when the variables were lagged one and two years concerning the coefficients of 
aggregate attacks and success rates. These results are available upon request from the authors. 
9
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Similar results obtained with the variable lagged 
one period are available upon request. 
10
 These results are available upon request from the authors. 
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t_hijack when total trade, manufactures and agricultural products are considered and are also 
positive and significant for raw materials and crude oil. One additional hijacked ship results in an 
increase of around 1.6 percent in maritime transport costs (Table 3, column 1) between Europe 
and Asia. A positive and significant effect is also found for manufactures and agricultural goods 
considered separately in both specifications and for raw materials and crude oil only using 
lagged values of piracy incidents. One additional act of hijacking results in an increase of around 
1.5 percent and 1.4 percent in maritime transport costs for manufactured goods and agricultural 
goods respectively. When considering boarded ships as piracy acts, the impact on transport costs 
is lower, but also positive and statistically significant for all categories of goods in Table 2 and 
for the two main categories (agricultural and manufactured products) in Table 3. 
According to our data, the unit maritime transport cost of footwear was US$0.505 in 2007, which 
for a shipment of 10,000 units of footwear between Europe and Asia amounts to US$5,050. One 
more act of hijacking results in an increase of US$75.75 for the shipment. Furthermore, if we 
also consider the number of piracy acts resulting in the successful boarding of a ship, transport 
costs would increase by US$96. The coefficient on the variable t_boarded is not statistically 
significant for raw materials or for crude oil when lagged values are used (Table 3, columns 4 
and 5). However for these two categories of goods the number of observations available is very 
low in comparison with manufactures and agricultural products. This is probably the reason why 
the results are less robust to changes in the specification.  
5.2 Robustness checks 
We mentioned that there is some controversy in the scientific community concerning the fact that 
pirates may choose the ships they attack according to the good transported. Since transport costs 
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depend on the nature of the goods transported, the piracy variable in Equation (3) might be 
endogenous. As a first robustness check, we estimate Equation (3) for ships transporting 
containers on the one hand and for tankers and ships transporting dirty bulk on the other. Tankers 
are one of the main categories of ships under attack according to the ICC database (see Table 
A.4). However, it seems that very few attacks on this kind of vessel are successful and result in 
hijacking. Among the 30 attacks on oil tankers in 2008, only one was successful
11
. Among the 
observations in our dataset, crude oil is transported by tanker, but also by dirty bulk ships. 
Therefore, we have aggregated these two categories. The results are shown in Table 4 and 
indicate that the impact of piracy is greater for tankers and ships transporting dirty bulk. 
[Table 4] 
As a second robustness check, we instrument the number of vessels hijacked with the number of 
hijacks in the three previous years (the same was done for number of boarding acts). The model 
is estimated using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) that is robust to heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation of unknown form. We also employed past boarding attempts as instruments, 
but the variables are correlated with the number of vessels hijacked and are not independent of 
the type of transported goods, therefore being correlated with the error term in our transport cost 
equation.   
The results of the GMM estimation are reported in Table 5 for all goods (column 1), for 
manufactures (column 2) and for agriculture (column 3). We were unable to find valid 
instruments for crude oil and raw materials. Our variable of interest stays positive and significant 
and the magnitude is similar to that obtained in Table 3. It is worth noting that although widely 
                                                          
11
 The successful attack on the Sirius Star, a new launch Saudi Arabian super tanker, made headlines for several 
weeks in 2008. It is still the largest ship captured by Somali pirates to date. 
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used in the empirical literature, the use of internal instruments may not be the best strategy. We 
leave this issue for further research. 
 [Table 5] 
As a third robustness check,
12
 we use warzone data for the period 2000-2010 and create a new 
variable indicating the number of warzones per trade route and year. Unfortunately, the 
methodology to classify war areas changed after 2004, creating an artificially large difference 
between the period 2000-2004 and 2005-2011 (See Figure A.5). Since the data for both periods 
are not comparable, we estimated the model separately for each period and also for the whole 
period. The results shown in Table A.5 indicate that war zones are associated with higher 
transport costs, especially in the second period (2 percent increase in trade costs when the route 
includes 1 additional war zone). The results are robust to adding aggregate attacks (see last 
column, Table A.5). This fact could be indicating that non-piracy related war zones are possibly 
also influencing transport prices. It is indeed likely that warzones directly influence costs –and 
especially insurance costs- regardless of piracy. The single correlation coefficients between 
warzone and aggregate attacks and the number of hijacks is 0.28 and 0.41, respectively.  
Finally, although our model cannot directly test the impact of the operation Atalanta
13
, we try to 
infer whether the operation could help to decrease transport costs by comparing the number of 
piracy incidents before and after the intervention. Patrol missions began in 2008 and an 
international maritime corridor protected by war ships (Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor or IRTC) was introduced in 2009 (Figure A.3). Figure A.4 presents the data for 
maritime piracy incidents (total and hijacked ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Region) 
                                                          
12
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
13
 Our transport cost data are only available for the period (1999-2007), whereas the operation Atlanta started in 
2008. 
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between 2001 and 2009. The beginning of the military operations in the region is indicated with 
a vertical red line. The figure shows that the number of hijacking acts has not decreased since 
operations began and the number of aggregate attacks linked to Somali piracy has increased 
considerably. These numbers reflect the changing strategy of the Somali pirates in response to 
the increasing military presence in the region. Pirates seem less successful in their attempts, 
probably due to the measures taken. As a consequence, to capture the same numbers of ships, 
pirates have increased their zone of action and the number of attacks. The naval presence has 
certainly increased the cost for Somali pirates by increasing the number of operations needed to 
seize a vessel, but it remains uncertain whether it has succeeded in decreasing maritime transport 
costs in the region. This last question requires further investigation. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we quantify the impact of modern maritime piracy on the maritime transport cost of 
trade between European Union and Asian countries. The main results indicate that the effect is 
substantial and significant. Piracy increases maritime trade costs between Europe and Asia by a 
non negligible amount. 
The presence of failed or weak states along the main maritime trade route between Europe and 
Asia selectively harms trade between the two continents. In a context where it has been 
demonstrated that a small downward variation in trade barriers could allow the entrance of 
smaller firms into international markets (Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2008), the disadvantage of 
higher transport costs between Europe and Asia harms European interests in comparison to its 
competitors’ in the expanding markets of Asia. 
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In addition, the increase in transport costs due to maritime piracy could lead to some shipping 
companies exploiting the Arctic route between Europe and Asia passing by the coasts of Russia. 
The route has been free of ice for at least three years from the end of August to the beginning of 
October. Without the cost of employing ice breaker ships to escort commercial vessels, the route 
has been demonstrated to be more economical than the Suez route (Xu et al. 2011). Adding the 
price of maritime piracy to the Suez route makes the northern route an interesting and safe 
alternative, at least for a few months. 
Until now, the various military operations put in place in the Gulf of Aden and in particular the 
operation Atalanta of the European Union have not succeeded to curb down the occurrence of 
piracy incidents, but it has forced the pirates to extend their range of action. It is only by 
reducing significantly the number of hijacking that the European navies could transfer the 
supplementary cost to ship merchandizes from private shipping companies and consumers to 
national governments and taxpayers. Future research should be directed towards determining the 
loss of welfare and the markets distortions associated with each of these two options.   
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Figure 1: Maritime regions 
  
Source: own elaboration using data from IMB Piracy Reporting Center, International Maritime Bureau, ICC 
Commercial Crime Services, London, UK. http://www.icc-ccs.org 
ES 
ISCS 
SEAS 
EAS 
RSGA 
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Figure 2: Average transport freight rates for two alternative routes 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Figure 3: Number of Piracy Incidents on the Europe-East Asia Trade Route 
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Source: own elaboration. 
Figure 4: Average Maritime unit transport costs for 4 types of goods (EU to Asia, dollars) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
TC 16152 0.3415101 1.014443 0 49.9656 
Ln Yi 16152 27.8959 2.241851 22.01682 30.38747 
Ln Yj 16152 28.17277 1.926653 24.21019 30.38747 
Ln Popi 16152 18.59602 1.689092 12.86876 20.99929 
Ln Popj 16152 18.6692 1.507516 15.19143 20.99929 
t_hijack 16152 14.34243 6.613979 1 28 
t_boarded 16152 135.6421 52.09402 34 246 
t_attempt 16152 64.45369 27.446 12 137 
Ln Imbij 15759 16.7 1.993194 7.149917 19.9472 
Ln XMij 15818 17.74937 1.90722 4.85203 20.54754 
War Zone 14477 16.05754 4.451584 6 21 
TC denotes unitary maritime transport cost. 
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Table 2: The effect of piracy on transport costs. Baseline Results  
LSDV All goods Manuf. Agric. Raw Mat. Crude Oil All goods All goods 
t_hijack 0.009** 0.007* 0.010* -0.011 -0.042                 
 2.213 1.714 1.862 -0.778 -1.377                 
t_boarded 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.016** 0.017**                  
 8.218 2.87 5.959 2.36 2.472                 
t_total      0.003***                
      8.675                
Success_rate       2.012*** 
       3.333 
Ln Yi -0.025 -0.014 -0.081 1.124 1.094*   -0.004 0.071 
 -0.456 -0.168 -1.269 1.157 2.06 -0.076 1.07 
Ln Yj  0.170*** 0.191*** 0.117 2.344*** 1.895**  0.202*** 0.215*** 
 2.922 2.785 1.247 5.613 2.598 3.281 2.873 
Ln Popi -0.428 -0.264 -0.001 -17.843** -14.560*   -0.587 -1.120*   
 -0.98 -0.396 -0.002 -2.857 -1.947 -1.285 -1.986 
Ln Popi -0.241 -0.176 0.791 -55.363*** -53.822*** -0.223 0.101 
 -0.372 -0.21 1.393 -5.821 -5.346 -0.348 0.135 
Ln Imbij -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.349* -0.133 -0.004 -0.007 
 -0.411 0.141 -0.244 -1.925 -0.592 -0.416 -0.704 
Ln XMij, t-1 -0.028 -0.087** 0.025 0.244 -0.176 -0.031 -0.045*   
 -1.379 -2.269 0.966 1.156 -0.337 -1.358 -1.774 
R
2
_adjusted 0.697 0.685 0.573 0.696 0.784 0.696 0.696 
Nobs 15758 11319 4244 110 85 15758 15758 
RMSE 0.4984662 0.5018692 0.4471734 0.6136655 0.5840678 0.4987232 0.4994913 
LL -11314.76 -8198.159 -2569.04 -83.46222 -57.91903 -11323.39 -11347.64 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country pair. Ln expresses natural 
logarithms. All regressions are with time, sector 2-digit and trading-pair fixed effects. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
29 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results with piracy variables and trade volumes lagged  
 
LSDV All goods Manuf. Agric. Raw Mat. Crude Oil 
t_hijack (t-2) 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.078*** 0.063**  
 
7.241 4.797 5.054 3.41 3.073 
t_boarded (t-2) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.008 -0.005 
 
4.111 2.906 5.713 -0.744 -0.995 
Ln Yi -0.081 -0.105 -0.071 -0.501 1.472*** 
 
-1.008 -1.176 -0.603 -0.213 4.229 
Ln Yj  0.372*** 0.369*** 0.319** 2.089* 2.074*** 
 
3.817 4.017 2.236 2.215 5.624 
Ln Popi -0.024 0.696 -1.347 -33.833 -7.557 
 
-0.039 0.918 -1.318 -1.553 -1.607 
Ln Popi -0.253 -0.539 1.349 -48.164** -38.839*** 
 
-0.375 -0.705 1.313 -2.509 -6.184 
Ln Imbij -0.02 -0.017 -0.007 -0.269 -0.293*** 
 
-1.536 -1.284 -0.359 -1.465 -3.292 
Ln XMij, t-1 0.004 -0.047 0.01 0.167 -0.094 
 
0.107 -0.853 0.286 0.828 -0.644 
R
2
_adjusted 0.741 0.734 0.601 0.636 0.812 
Nobs 10847 7831 2899 60 57 
RMSE 0.4396452 0.4414019 0.3954396 0.6187129 0.5100989 
LL -6406.845 -4651.623 -1390.041 -38.39437 -26.05642 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country pair. Ln expresses natural 
logarithms. All regressions are with time, sector 2-digit and trading-pair fixed effects. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Results for Containerized trade and for Tankers and dirty bulk 
LSDV 
2 lags 1 lag 
Containers DirtyBulk+tankers Containers DirtyBulk+tankers 
t_hijack (t-2)/(t-1) 0.013*** 0.060*** 0.014*** 0.021** 
 
7.811 9.423 6.666 2.237 
t_boarded (t-2)/(t-1) 0.005*** -0.005 0.004*** -0.005 
 
4.687 -0.934 4.676 -1.685 
Ln Yi -0.126* 0.700** -0.049 0.596 
 
-1.698 2.141 -0.758 1.671 
Ln Yj  0.347*** 1.471*** 0.127** 0.022 
 
3.622 3.158 2.543 0.041 
Ln Popi 0.463 -4.672 -0.103 -3.764 
 
0.745 -0.913 -0.253 -0.837 
Ln Popi -0.287 -37.920*** 0.307 -22.894** 
 
-0.448 -5.452 0.535 -2.862 
Ln Imbij -0.01 -0.218** -0.009 -0.103 
 
-0.803 -2.706 -0.589 -1.439 
Ln XMij, t-1 -0.028 0.095 0.021 0.031 
 
-0.602 0.72 0.553 0.181 
R
2
_adjusted 0.732 0.738 0.728 0.681 
Nobs 10972 205 12735 243 
RMSE 0.4407706 0.5555792 0.4460124 0.60134 
LL -6514.1 -149.9926 -7720.481 -200.5523 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country pair. Ln expresses natural 
logarithms. All regressions are with time, sector 2-digit and trading-pair fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) 
present the results when the second lag (first lag) of the piracy variables are used. ***, **, *, indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Generalized Method of Moments estimation results  
GMM All goods Manuf. Agric. 
t_hijack 0.011*** 0.009 0.014*** 
 
2.858 1.503 3.108 
t_attempt 0.006*** 0.005** 0.007*** 
 
4.255 2.197 3.915 
Ln Yi -0.276*** -0.301*** -0.306**  
 
-3.454 -3.141 -2.127 
Ln Yj  0.325*** 0.380*** 0.141 
 
3.913 3.912 0.942 
Ln Popi 0.052 0.884 -1.508*   
 
0.105 1.49 -1.709 
Ln Popi -1.624*** -1.908*** 0.008 
 
-3.167 -3.044 0.011 
Ln Imbij 0.001 0.005 0.003 
 
0.073 0.291 0.126 
Ln XMij, t-1 -0.021 -0.071 0.013 
 
-0.606 -1.412 0.267 
R
2
 0.75 0.744 0.619 
Nobs 9028 6522 2415 
Hansen 8.729 4.212 5.05 
 (prob) 0.071 0.378 0.28 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country pair. Ln expresses natural 
logarithms. All regressions are with time, sector 2-digit and trading-pair fixed effects. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Maritime Region Navigated according to each trade route 
Maritime Route Maritime regions navigated 
European Seas 
(ES) 
Red Sea/ Gulf 
of Aden 
(RGSA) 
Indian Sub 
Continental 
Seas (ISCS) 
South East 
Asian Seas 
(SEAS) 
East Asian 
Seas (SEC) 
Europe - Indian Sub 
Continent 
X X X   
Europe - South East Asia X X X X  
Europe - East Asia X X X X X 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table A.2: Sources and variables 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
TCijt : Unit Maritime Transport 
Cost from i to j in year t 
Cost in $ to transport one unit of 
good from a country i to a country j 
in year t 
OECD 
Independent Variables Description Source 
Yit : Exporter’s income Exporter GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
Yjt : Importer’s income Importer GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
t_boarded number of ships boarded by pirates 
on a particular route and year 
IMB 
t_hijack number of ships hijacked by pirates 
on a particular route 
IMB 
t_attempt number of attempted acts of piracy 
on a particular route 
IMB 
Imbijt Trade imbalance between country i 
and country j 
WDI 
XMijt Trade volumes between countries i 
and j in year t 
Eurostat 
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Distij Distances between trading partner 
capital cities (km) 
CEPII  
 
Table A.3: Maritime War Zones 
Listed Areas 1/8/11 3/3/11 16/11/10 2/8/10 11/3/10 25/11/09 
Africa 
     
  
Benin 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Djibouti excluding transit 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Eritrea, but only South of 15o N  1 1 1 1 0 0 
Gulf of Guinea 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ivory Coast  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Libya 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Somalia 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indian Ocean / Arabian Sea / Gulf of Aden / Gulf of Oman 
/ Southern Red Sea 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asia 
     
  
Pakistan 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Thailand, but only the area of the southern Gulf coast  0 0 0 0 0 1 
Eastern Europe  
     
  
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indonesia 
     
  
The port of Balikpapan (SE Borneo) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Borneo, but only the north east coast  1 1 1 1 1 1 
The port of Jakarta  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sumatra, but only the north eastern coast 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Middle East 
     
  
Bahrain excluding transit  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Iran 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Iraq, including all Iraqi offshore oil terminals 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Israel  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Lebanon  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar excluding transit  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Saudi Arabia excluding transit 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Yemen 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Philipinnes 
  
  
  
  
Mindanao 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sulu Archipelago 1 1 1 1 1 1 
South America 
     
  
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Joint War Committee, Listed Areas (Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils), reports 2011, 2010, 
2009 (www.lmalloyds.com and www.iua.co.uk.) 
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Table A.4: Type of vessels attacked (%) 
Type of Vessels 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bulk Carrier 25.62% 22.19% 29.35% 23.85% 12.17% 16.38% 
Container 12.58% 14.59% 10.87% 20.50% 20.15% 16.72% 
General cargo 16.40% 11.55% 16.67% 12.55% 13.69% 12.97% 
Refrigerated 1.57% 3.04% 1.09% 1.26% 2.66% 2.73% 
Tanker Chem. / Product 11.01% 17.02% 15.58% 14.64% 19.77% 18.77% 
Tanker Crude Oil 9.44% 5.17% 7.97% 3.77% 9.51% 10.24% 
Tanker LPG 3.15% 3.95% 1.81% 1.67% 1.90% 2.05% 
Trawler / Fishing 6.29% 5.47% 2.54% 7.53% 6.08% 3.07% 
Tug 4.27% 7.29% 4.71% 3.77% 2.66% 5.46% 
Yacht 3.37% 3.34% 2.54% 4.18% 3.04% 3.07% 
Other 6.29% 6.38% 6.88% 6.28% 8.37% 8.53% 
Source: IMB report 2008. 
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Table A.5: Estimating the effect of Warzones on transport costs   
Time Period: 2000-2004 2005-2007 2000-2007 2000-2007 
Variables: b/t b/t b/t b/t    
Warzone (1 lag) -0.003 0.026*** 0.004* 0.005**  
 
-1.388 3.158 1.75 2.646 
Attacks  (1 lag) 
   
0.001*** 
    
5.754 
Ln Yi -0.123 0.241 -0.007 0.046 
 
-1.195 1.193 -0.095 0.646 
Ln Yj  0.729*** 0.385 0.427*** 0.500*** 
 
7.258 1.603 3.652 4.524 
Ln Popi 0.989 -2.752 -1.928** -1.210**  
 
0.793 -1.417 -2.657 -2.048 
Ln Popi -3.715** -0.461 -1.669* -1.548*   
 
-2.47 -0.219 -1.906 -2.004 
Ln tradeim -0.043 -0.073** -0.031** -0.035*** 
 
-1.291 -2.361 -2.156 -2.784 
Ln XM 0.007 0.151 0.001 0.01 
 
0.12 1.004 0.022 0.19 
Constant 28.912 31.41 46.075*** 29.203**  
 
0.889 0.796 2.886 2.069 
R
2
_a 0.758 0.713 0.722 0.724 
Nobs 6379 5109 11488 11488 
RMSE 0.4217721 0.4756815 0.4592004 0.4576549 
LL -3477.788 -3385.441 -7292.117 -7252.882 
Note: t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country pair. L expresses natural 
logarithms. All regressions are with time, sector 2-digit and trading-pair fixed effects. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Figure A.1: Number of piracy incidents in each region between 1999 and 2007 
 
RGSA stands for Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, ISCS for Indian Sub Continent Seas, SEAS for South East Asia Seas 
and EAS for East Asia Seas. Source: own elaboration. 
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Figure A.2: Number of incidents on three different routes linking Europe and Asia  
 
Source: own elaboration. The routes are: Indian Sub-Continental Seas (ISC), the South-East-Asian Seas (SEA) and 
the East-Asian Seas (EA).  
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Figure A.3: Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
    
Figure A.4: Piracy acts in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Region from 2001 to 2010 
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Source: International Maritime Bureau. 
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Figure A.5: Number of Warzones on each trade route 
 
Source: Joint War Committee, Listed Areas (Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils), reports 2000-2011.  
 
